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Introduction
An Ethics of the Unruly

There is ethics — that is to say, an injunction which
cannot be grounded in ontology — in so far as there is a
crack in the ontological edifice of the universe: at its most
elementary, ethics designates fidelity to this crack.
Slavoj Žižek

The late twentieth century witnessed unprecedented attention to ethics in
literary studies. This burgeoning academic interest proved strong enough to
earn the label “Ethical Turn,” a term that points to an undeniable shift in the
concerns of interpretive communities but risks homogenizing the unruly
voices responsible for such a change.1 A genealogy of the turn quickly reveals
its contested origins, its fraught beginnings, and its uncertain duration. Is/was
the “Ethical Turn” a mere moment in the cyclical history of interpretive turns,
situated between the “Linguistic Turn” and the nascent “Aesthetic Turn,” with
the “Political Turn” eagerly waiting in the hermeneutic queue?2 While debates
over the function of literary criticism surely date back to the very inception of
literature, Frank Kermode detects among contemporary critics an unparalleled hostility to both the ethical value of criticism (which, in the past, “was
extremely important; it could be taught; it was an influence for civilization
and even for personal amendment”3) and the aesthetic value of literature in
its own right.4 It might be tempting to see the “turn to ethics” as a kind of
exorcism of the post-68 mentality that gave us the slogan of “the death of the
author” and the rise of symptomatic readings.5 The turn to ethics would be,
1
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in this respect, tantamount to a return to the so-called older dispensation. By
contrast, Wayne C. Booth resists such a nostalgic and potentially reactionary
move in his 1988 The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction, and adopts a
broader and less exclusionary definition of ethics, not only taking stock of a
new ethical sensibility sweeping literary studies but also, and perhaps more
importantly, reading it back into its most trenchant opponents:
I’m thinking here not only of the various new overtly ethical and political
challenges to “formalism”: by feminist critics asking embarrassing questions about a male-dominated literary canon and what it has done to the
“consciousness” of both men and women; by black critics pursuing Paul
Moses’s kind of question about racism in American classics; by neo-Marxists
exploring class biases in European literary traditions; by religious critics
attacking modern literature for its “nihilism” or “atheism.” I am thinking more of the way in which even those critics who work hard to purge
themselves of all but the most abstract formal interests turn out to have an
ethical program in mind — a belief that a given way of reading, or a given
kind of genuine literature, is what will do us most good.6
The following study takes seriously the invitation to adopt a more inclusive
approach to ethics (one that brings contesting viewpoints together under the
umbrella of ethical criticism) but remains wary of defining an ethics of reading
as a commitment to the “most good,” a term at once disarming for its obviousness (who, among ethical critics, doubts that a literary ethical sensibility
is beneficial?) and alarming for its vagueness (what is meant by beneficial or
good?). Reading Unruly: Interpretation and Its Ethical Demands advocates an
ethics of interpretation that foregrounds fidelity to literature’s unruliness, that
is, its resistance to hermeneutic mastery, its ungovernable character. Such an
ethics deviates from the paradigmatic model of Neo-Aristotelian tradition,
according to which the reader’s ethical task requires the faithful reconstruction of the beliefs, values, and norms that the author desires to communicate.7 While this tradition emphasizes questions of exemplarity — the belief
that literature teaches us through examples and counterexamples — Reading
Unruly conceives of fidelity as related less to the interpretation of an artwork’s
content or message than to the reader’s receptivity and responsiveness to it.
Attesting faithfully to the unruly, and to the “singularity of literature,” to
borrow Derek Attridge’s suggestive formulation, means vigilantly resisting
literature’s conflation with moral philosophy. Disentangling a literary work’s
2
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ethical concern from its universalist aspiration is perhaps the most distinctive feature of this mode of ethical criticism. An ethics of reading articulated
in these terms owes much to literary theorists such as Roland Barthes and
Maurice Blanchot, who constantly underscored literature’s recalcitrance,
as well as to Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, whose philosophical work brought about a shift in hermeneutic climate and reorientation of
ethics toward responsiveness.8 Reading Unruly puts these disparate lines of
thought into relation with one another in the goal not of harmonizing their
contradictions but of exploring their productive tensions in an effort to think
the future of an ethics/aesthetics of difference and its multiple challenges.
What is in contention in debates over the place of alterity and universalism
in ethical criticism is the paradigmatic status of the face-to-face encounter as
a fruitful model, or at the very least a source of inspiration, for thinking differently the relation to the literary. Analogously related to the self ’s exposure to
the other, characterized in Levinasian terms by excess and opacity, the reader’s
relation to the work, on this model, takes the form of an “interpellation.”9 In
the act of reading, the reader confronts a “double bind,” two competing and
conflicting injunctions. The first is to thematize or make sense of the work’s
aesthetic otherness — that is, to adhere to the rules of literary discourse, the
protocols of commentary. The second, however, is to attend to the work’s
inventiveness — its seductive refractoriness — to recognize that the attempt
to give meaning and the appeal to contextual markers (cultural, historical, or
authorial) might very well elucidate aspects of a literary work but can never
exhaust that meaning nor fully meet or answer its ethical demands. Needless
to say, the movement between these two injunctions is shot through with
hesitation. “To find oneself reading an inventive work,” as Attridge puts it,
“is to find oneself subject to certain obligations — to respect its otherness, to
respond to its singularity, to avoid reducing it to the familiar and the utilitarian
even while attempting to comprehend by relating it to these.”10
The double bind reminds the reader of his or her status as an interpreter. In
rejecting consumption as a preferred model of reading, the responsive reader
that emerges from a Levinasian-inspired ethics resembles Barthes’s producer of
text, a reader who actively engages “writerly” (or scriptible) fiction by becoming
a willing collaborator in the production of its meaning(s) — by becoming an
inventive reader, so to speak.11 Breaking with the consumerist model of reading,
Barthes calls for the radicalization of the “work of commentary,” so that the
task of the reader no longer consists in slavishly following the “classic text,”
3
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nor in repeating it (via a faithful commentary), but in “manhandl[ing] the
text, interrupt[ing] it,”12 demystifying its apparent “naturalness” by revealing
its “constructedness” (its ideological staging of meaning as something transparent and self-evident). More recently, Slavoj Žižek has advanced a similar
agonistic model of interpretation, deploying the shock of short-circuiting as
a metaphor for critical reading:
A short circuit occurs when there is a faulty connection in the network — faulty, of course, from the standpoint of the network’s smooth
functioning. Is not the shock of short-circuiting, therefore, one of the best
metaphors for critical reading? Is not one of the most effective critical
procedures to cross wires that do not usually touch: to take a major classic
(text, author, notion), and read it in a short-circuiting way, through the
lens of a “minor” author, text, or conceptual apparatus . . . ? If the minor
reference is well chosen, such a procedure can lead to insights which completely shatter and undermine our common perceptions.13
The Žižekian reader performs a symptomatic reading — a more radicalized
version of Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” — challenging the text’s
surface meaning in order to disclose its blind spots or “unthought.”14 Toward
that end, the literary text (or any text) is no longer to be conceived in isolation,
only in terms of its own discourse. Appeals to other fields of study (psychoanalysis, anthropology, philosophy, sociology, etc.) are particularly welcome,
since their otherness plays a crucial role in “short-circuiting” the source text.
Žižek’s daring electrician and Barthes’s manhandler of text are both endowed
with a strong sense of agency — an agency necessary, in this model, to the
execution and performance of productive readings. Yet such a model poses
a number of problems: What or who really gets short-circuited here? Do
these models not conflate the text as such and dominant interpretations of
the text (interpretations legitimized by a given interpretive community)? Is
agency clearly on the side of the reader? Or is it on the side of the inventive
works — unruly texts that short-circuit the dogmatic or doctrinal reader?15
In The Pleasure of the Text, Barthes can be seen as exploring the latter
alternative, tying unruliness more closely to literary texts themselves, and
more specifically, to the different kinds of pleasures that they solicit from
their readers. For Barthes, the experience of plaisir (pleasure) results from
a “comfortable practice of reading,”16 a communicable knowledge about the
reader’s societal values, whereas the experience of jouissance (a sexualized
4
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sense of pleasure [from the verb jouir, meaning “to come”] that evokes, at
once, joy and dismay) “imposes a state of loss”17 by jolting the reader out of
docility and complacency, out of his or her sense of communal belonging. Yet
Barthes himself refuses a strict opposition between the two. He maintains that
the text of pleasure (what he had previously characterized as the “readerly”
or classic text), or more generally, any experience of aesthetics, holds the
potential for unruliness, because the idea of pleasure itself — or rather the
insistence on pleasure — “can embarrass the text’s return to morality, to truth:
to the morality of truth: it is an oblique, a drag anchor, so to speak, without
which the theory of the text would revert to a centered system, a philosophy of
meaning.”18 The reader’s taste for pleasure, then, produces cognitive friction,
blocking the most blatant forms of instrumentalization and commodification:
literature’s reduction to either scientific-like knowledge or pure didacticism.
At the same time, however, pleasure and the processes of normalization are
not, strictly speaking, at odds with one another:
Now the subject who keeps the two texts in his field and in his hands the
reins of pleasure and bliss is an anachronic subject, for he simultaneously
and contradictorily participates in the profound hedonism of all culture
(which permeates him quietly under cover of an art de vivre shared by the
old books) and in the destruction of that culture: he enjoys the consistency
of his selfhood (that is his pleasure) and seeks its loss (that is his bliss).
He is a subject split twice over, doubly perverse.19
Hedonism both perpetuates the principle of identity and calls for its dissolution; it sustains and interrupts the subject’s self-sufficiency or conatus
essendi, the desire to persist in being. For the reader, then, hedonism offers
the possibility for both socialization (yet another instantiation, albeit a more
“pleasurable” one, of the process of subjectivization20) and emancipation
(the possibility of “get[ting] free from oneself ” [se déprendre de soi-même],”
as Foucault puts it).21 While the concept of the text of jouissance qualifies the
model of the reader as producer, it does not really break its general mold;
behind the orgasmic experience of self-dissolution lies a narcissistic reader,
freely desiring and indulging in eroticized fantasies.22 Unlike the writerly,
which might be said to please the reader by submitting to his or her phantasms, the unruly, as I have been describing it, interpellates; it solicits from
the reader an ethical response. Unruly works call upon the reader not only to
produce and delight in potentially endless interpretations but also to hesitate,
5
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to sustain their singularity, and to resist the narcissistic assumption that they
exist purely for oneself. 23 To put it differently, answerability necessitates an
alternative mode of reading, one that moves beyond the dualistic, stale model
of a passive/active consumption.
In The Writing of the Disaster, Maurice Blanchot ostensibly gestures toward
such a reading:
There is an active, productive way of reading which produces text and reader
and thus transports us. There is a passive kind of reading which betrays the
text while appearing to submit to it, by giving the illusion that the text exists
objectively, fully, sovereignly: as one whole. Finally, there is the reading that
is no longer passive, but is passivity’s reading. It is without pleasure, without
joy; it escapes both comprehension and desire. It is like the nocturnal vigil,
that “inspiring” insomnia when, all having been said, “Saying” [le Dire] is
heard, and the testimony of the last witness is pronounced.24
Blanchot’s last type of reading — “passivity’s reading” — undercuts any
instrumental relation to the text. His analysis invites us to reevaluate the
one-dimensional model of reading as consumption but also to question the
reader’s autonomy and agency (actualized in the pleasurable practice of interpretation, that is, an interpretation without hesitation) and the communicative
dimension of reading and writing, since the “Saying” of the text is ultimately
incommensurable with anything said or spoken; it expresses no meaning.
Recalling Levinas’s philosophy of the other, this uncanny model of reading compels us to reconfigure what it means to care — to develop a genuine
openness to textual otherness that is at odds with the ideal of self-care as
self-mastery.25 In Totality and Infinity, Levinas locates the ethical moment in
the face-to-face encounter with the other, which he describes as a primordial
moment of cognitive frustration — since the other’s face “exceed[s] the idea
of the other in me” — that brings into question the autonomy, spontaneity,
and self-sufficiency of the self.26 The face of the other interrupts the self ’s
habitual economy, its tendency to reduce otherness to the order of the Same.
Like Levinas, Blanchot foregrounds the exposure to otherness in his experience of literature, making it analogous to the Levinasian encounter with the
face of the other.27 Unruliness, in this inflection, is more or less synonymous
with pure difference, the anarchic and the non-thematizable. Though appealing in its alternative approach to literary criticism (criticism as a determination of textual meaning or an appreciation of a work’s formal features), the
6
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emphasis on radical alterity, on that which is putatively beyond or even prior
to discursivity, threatens to transform the literary work into an unspeakable,
unknowable, and unassayable mystical Text.28
So is Levinasian otherness truly a viable model for an ethics of the unruly?
Alain Badiou has taken issue with Levinas’s dominant, cult-like status in ethical circles, and with his having almost single-handedly framed all of ethical
discourse in terms of an “ethics of difference” (a category under which he
lumps together, not unproblematically, multiculturalism, postcolonialism, and
poststructuralism).29 Badiou scrutinizes, in particular, Levinas’s contention
that the other is radically other: “The other always resembles me too much
for the hypothesis of an originary exposure of his alterity to be necessarily
true.”30 For Levinas, he argues, the source of the other’s radical otherness or
transcendent alterity must originate elsewhere, in an absolute Other, which
can, ultimately, only be God: “There can be no ethics without God the ineffable” (22). When one tries to secularize Levinas’s ethics of difference, by
bracketing the divine, as it were, the result is simply a “decomposed religion,”
worth no more than “dog’s dinner [de la bouillie pour les chats]” (23). Such
an ethics of difference treats all others as others abstractly and formally, but
in practice distinguishes between others who resemble oneself and those
who do not. As Badiou puts it, “This celebrated ‘other’ is acceptable only if
he is a good other. . . . That is to say: I respect differences, but only, of course,
in so far as that which differs also respects, just as I do, the said differences”
(24). Pace Levinas, Badiou makes the recognition of the Same central to
the ethical act, and ties ethics to truth, “the coming-to-be of that which is
not yet” (27):
The whole ethical predication based upon recognition of the other should
be purely and simply abandoned. For the real question — and it is an
extraordinarily difficult one — is much more that of recognizing the Same. . . .
The Same, in effect, is not what is (i.e. the infinite multiplicity of differences) but what comes to be. I have already named that in regard to which
only the advent of the Same occurs: it is a truth. Only a truth is, as such,
indifferent to differences. (25, 27)31
Truth takes the form of a commitment, a response to the demand of what
Badiou calls an “event”: it is “the real process of fidelity to an event” (42).32
Receptivity and response to the event are inextricably linked for Badiou.
In an ethical framework that is uncannily reminiscent of Levinas’s, Badiou’s
7
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notion of “event,” which he associates with the Lacanian Real (52), can be
described as a situated experience of the unruly: the disorganizing and deroutinizing alterity of the event reveals a “void” in the order of being (the Symbolic
order), involving an interpellation (the becoming-subject of the event) and
an unending task of responsibility (the ethical subject’s subsequent “fidelity” to this “crack in the ontological edifice of the universe,” to recall Žižek’s
language quoted in the epigraph).33 “To be really faithful to the event,” writes
Badiou, “I must completely rework my ordinary way of living my situation”
(41–42). While the truth-event is open to all, Badiou insists on its irreducible
singularity and the incommunicability of its meaning: “What arises from a
truth-process . . . cannot be communicated. . . . To enter into the composition
of a subject of truth can only be something that happens to you. Confirmation
of the point is provided by the concrete circumstances in which someone is
seized by a fidelity” (47). Žižek perceives an ironic affinity between Badiou
and Levinas on this point: “Does Badiou, the anti-Levinas, with this topic of
the respect for the unnameable, not come dangerously close precisely to the
Levinasian notion of the respect for Otherness?”34
Whereas Žižek sees in Badiou unfortunate lapses into Levinasianism, I
propose to read Badiou against the grain, to read Badiou with Levinas, and to
pursue an alternative basis for their rapprochement, one that passes through
Derrida’s encounter with Levinas before returning to the demands of fidelity.
In “Violence and Metaphysics,” an earlier, and more generous, engagement
with Levinas’s thought (one that predates Badiou’s by three decades), Derrida
similarly called into question Levinas’s ethics of difference, disputing “the
dream of a purely heterological thought,” “a pure thought of pure difference.”35 Yet
Derrida does not dismiss Levinas’s radical project. Quite the contrary: while
scrupulously exposing Levinas’s dependence on a philosophical discourse that
he claims to have left behind, Derrida nevertheless argues that the question
is not one of choosing between “the opening and the totality,”36 infinity and
sameness. Refusing either/or logic, Derrida prefers to hesitate between the
two in response to the challenge of Levinasian philosophy. Adopting instead
a logic of both/and, Derrida works through and against Levinas’s philosophy,
insisting on the relationality of the other. Though there is always something
surprising about the other, something “wholly other [tout autre],”37 a pure
or unmediated encounter with the other remains something of a phantasm.
And to be sure, we find Derrida, at times, all too enthralled by this phantasm
of a “pure ethics”:
8
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Pure ethics, if there is any, begins with the respectable dignity of the other
as absolute unlike, recognized as nonrecognizable, indeed as unrecognizable, beyond all knowledge, all cognition and all recognition: far from
being the beginning of pure ethics, the neighbor as like or as resembling,
as looking like, spells the end or the ruin of such an ethics, if there is any.38
Yet we must pay sufficient attention to Derrida’s self-puncturing moments of
doubt, such as the one above, where Derrida entertains thoughts of a pure
ethics while qualifying such remarks with the repetition of the words “if there
is any” — drawing attention, as it were, to the phantasmatic character of a
“pure ethics.” Relationality rather than absolute separation conditions my
relation to the other. Abraham’s asymmetrical relation to God exemplifies
what Derrida paradoxically characterizes as a “relation without relation,” a
“rapport sans rapport.”39 “What can be said about Abraham’s relation to God
can be said about my relation without relation to every other (one) as every (bit)
other [tout autre comme tout autre], in particular my relation to my neighbor
or my loved ones who are as inaccessible to me, as secret and transcendent as
Jahweh.”40 Perplexingly entailing both a relation and a nonrelation to the other,
this relationless relation joins and disjoins. It answers the aporetic demands
made upon me by the other: to be understood without being reduced to an
object of comprehension, to never dissolve the “without” of the “relation
without relation” that interrupts any traditional, static subject-object relation
of knowledge and that respects (by sustaining through discourse) the enigmaticity and irreducibility of the other. Derrida’s ethics (of the relationless
relation), as Gayatri Spivak incisively notes, is “not a problem of knowledge
but a call of relationship (without relationship, as limit case).”41 Denoting
more than an epistemological impasse, ethics is an exposure to the demands
of the other, that is, an invitation for interpretation.
In his later philosophical masterwork, Otherwise than Being, Levinas implicitly responds to the concerns Derrida expressed in “Violence and Metaphysics,”
moving away from the face-to-face encounter as the paradigmatic ethical scene
to the question of language and the possibility of ethical figuring. Levinas comes
to realize that the ethical can signify within the realm of representation, that
the language of ontology does not preclude nor exhaust what Levinas calls the
“ethical Saying” (in this respect, Blanchot’s evocation of the “Saying” in The
Writing of the Disaster might register a different meaning). Contrasting Saying
(le Dire) with the Said (le Dit) — “the birth place of ontology”42 — Levinas
9
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argues that saying “is not a modality of cognition” (48) nor an “exchange of
information” (92). Reminiscent of the “phatic” function of language in its
insistence on intersubjectivity — the contact between speaker and addressee
without the transfer of information — Saying expresses nothing but the desire
to communicate.43 Levinas is aware, however, of the paradox that as soon as
one utters something, once meaning happens, one enters into the domain
of the Said. Yet he does not stop there. Refusing the false choice between
Saying and the Said, between pure alterity and comprehension, respect and
violence, Levinas advocates a kind of skepticism, an “endless critique” (44)
or “an incessant unsaying of the said [un incessant dédit du Dit]” (181). The
unruliness of the Saying, then, invariably passes through the scene of language;
its anarchic character is not obliterated (domesticated) but preserved and
rearticulated through the activities of interpretation and rereading.44
In a similar vein, Derrida urges us to go beyond the stagnant, predictable
debate over sameness and difference, pointing out that relating ethically to
otherness or alterity should not lead to either a cannibalistic (purely assimilative) or a noncannibalistic (purely indigestible) mode of contact: “The moral
question is . . . not, nor has it ever been: should one eat or not eat . . . but
since one must eat in any case . . . how for goodness sake should one eat well
[bien manger]?”45 Reframing the terms of the ethical debate, Derrida insists
that fidelity to the other will always bring with it a sense of betrayal, since
fidelity as such does not lie in refusing the Said in order to dwell only in the
idyllic time of the Saying, but in the ethical exigency to unsay and resay the
Said — to perpetually “eat better.”46
Extrapolating from Derrida’s comments, I would argue that the notion of
eating well serves as a more fitting metaphor for ethical criticism, an ethically
preferable hermeneutic mode through which to assess the inventive work.
First of all, it helps move beyond the early reception of Levinas in literary
studies, which always risked moral sentimentalism by reducing the disruptive
Levinasian encounter with the other to a series of predictable, familiar, and
easily translatable pathetic scenes. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
notion of eating well gestures to an understanding of and engagement with
the aesthetic unruly that take the form of a response.47 Creatively hesitating
between incommensurable demands (to interpret but not to translate back
into familiar terms), the ethical reader is invited to cultivate an appreciation
for the unruly, to curb his or her desire for hermeneutic mastery (a desire
that finds its origins in the Symbolic Order and the voracious appetite for
10
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consumption that it propagates) without simultaneously renouncing meaning
or the interpretive endeavor.48 Doing justice to the unruly both acknowledges and endlessly works to counter this desire to master, comprehend, or
pin down a work’s meaning.49 Reading itself becomes a desire for more, a
transgressive desire not to arrest but to prolong the act of interpretation. As
such, interpretation, then, can be described as “imperfect” in the etymological sense of incomplete, “foreign to the category of completion,” as Blanchot
notes in his musings on “fragmentary speech” in The Infinite Conversation.50
Reading unruly is obviously also a learned behavior (“how we read” matters as much as “what we read”51), and does not constitute in any way a more
“natural” ethico-aesthetic disposition toward literature (what a timeless ethics
of reading presupposes). To fail to see reading as a historically and culturally specific practice is to fall prey to ideology. In seeing works as unruly we
must not ignore the reconstructive or belated quality of such a recognition.52
Moreover, unruliness as such is not located in the text, ready to be deciphered
by its faithful reader; it is not an immanent or formal property of the literary
work, connoting, for instance, its essential ambiguity (as in New Criticism).
Nor is it adequately understood as an incommunicable sublime or epiphanic
moment of a truth event (Badiou’s version of the Real).53 On the latter, Žižek
offers a suggestive alternative, redefining the Real in terms of the parallax
gap. If parallax is commonly understood as “the apparent displacement of an
object (the shift of its position against a background), caused by a change in
observational position,” for Žižek, the parallax gap signifies far more, enabling
him to reconceptualize the interpretive scene itself. As he puts it,
The philosophical twist to be added [to the standard definition of parallax] . . . is that the observed difference is not simply “subjective,” due to
the fact that the same object which exists “out there” is seen from two
different stances, or points of view. It is rather that . . . subject and object
are inherently “mediated,” so that an “epistemological” shift in the subject’s
point of view always reflects an “ontological” shift in the object itself.54
Reading Lacan with Hegel, and Hegel with Lacan, Žižek conceives of the dialectic as an ongoing process involving a constant shift in perspective between
two points “between which no synthesis or mediation is possible” (4): indeed,
the parallax gap reveals that “there is no common language, no shared ground”
(5) on or through which such a synthesis or mediation could take place.
The notion of the parallax view has led Žižek to clarify his own understanding
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of the function of the Real; no longer conceived as that which “always returns
to its place,” the Lacanian Real is now better understood as the gap between
appearances, something — or rather a “nonsubstantial” thing — that is triangulated or retroactively reconstructed through the interpretive work of
analysis and critique (26). Žižek explicitly distances the parallax gap from
Badiou’s notion of the event, accusing Badiou of binary thought, stressing
that “there is nothing but the order of Being” (167), that the event as such is
constitutive of the order of Being.
Recalling Derrida’s now infamous — but often misunderstood — “there is
nothing outside of the text [il n’y pas de hors-texte],”55 we can agree with Žižek
that, analogously, there is no outside the order of Being if by “no outside the
order of Being,” one means that the event is profoundly relational, even if (or
because) it is a strain on relationality. That is, in the exposure to the event, one,
strictly speaking, does not have a relation to Being nor a nonrelation to Being.
Parallactic thinking, in its constant oscillation between incommensurable
perspectives, fosters a Derridean mode of interpretation that helps to sustain
the “without” of the “relation without relation,” that is, the double bind of
the ethical relation.56 The double bind of ethical criticism can thus be reread
dialectically in terms of the parallax gap:57 the two injunctions informing our
exposure to the aesthetic object (both not to compromise and to compromise
on the singularity of the aesthetic work) share no common language. The “Real”
of the literary work, so to speak, resides in this parallax gap.
Taking seriously Badiou’s ethical call to “persevere in the interruption”
(47) thus requires a more robust understanding of the unruliness of the event
and of the ethical demands it imposes on its faithful subjects. Unruliness,
indistinguishable from the experience of unruliness, does not exist outside
interpretive communities, but is generated by them and contributes as well
to their “engine of change,”58 compelling unsatisfied readers to think with
and beyond their existing protocols of interpretation and current norms
of readability. What is at the heart of this dissatisfaction is an unruly will to
know/enjoy, a curiosity that the event of reading does not so much create
ex nihilo as accentuate and enable. It is a type of curiosity that disrupts the
economy of the Same, the reduction of the new to the familiar. It is a “passion
for knowledge,” as Foucault aptly put it, that does not seek “to assimilate what
it is proper for one to know” but results in the “straying afield” of oneself,
effectively disrupting the sovereignty and centrality of the knowing self.59
In this respect, curiosity would lead not only to a sense of empowerment (I
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want to know) but also to one of vulnerability and heteronomy (the object
of knowledge is irreducible to me). Curiosity, and the kind of knowledge (or
truth, in Badiou’s terms) it generates, introduces a critical distance between
the reader and his or her interpretive community: to be a curious reader is to
remain always open to the event of reading, to the surprising and “incalculable
novelty” of its truth.60 Curiosity, then, functions as an antidote to interpretive
conformism, opening the possibility, even if momentarily, for “no longer being,
doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.”61 With curiosity also comes a
sense of care, an eye for the unruly:
Curiosity . . . evokes “care” [souci]; it evokes the care [soin] one takes of
what exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of reality, but one
that is never immobilized before it; a readiness to find what surrounds
us strange and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of
thought and to look at the same things in a different way; a passion for
seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing; a lack of respect
for the traditional hierarchies of what is important and fundamental.62
A readiness to find in literary works strangeness and unfamiliarity, or what
we might describe as an unruly care for the unruly, is a sine qua non for
experiencing aesthetic jouissance.
Like the just judge — whose legal judgment, as Derrida points out, does
not simply consist of “applying the law” like “a calculating machine”63 but
requires that each decision be the result of an invention64 — the curious reader/
the subject of aesthetic pleasure confronts, and returns to, each book as a
singularity, answering its interpellation as reader-judge, its call for “an absolutely unique interpretation.”65 Ethical exigency is not a hermeneutic necessity;
ethics emerges precisely in the absence of interpretive certainty.66 Yet, to be
clear, what an inventive work elicits from its reader is not a dismissal of all
prior commentaries (an attempt to read a work in a historical vacuum), but
a recognition of the reader’s infinite responsibility as an interpretive subject.
And to borrow from Badiou’s example of Saint Paul, who, as a faithful subject
of the event of Christ’s resurrection, enacts his fidelity to its truth by preaching the Word (“there is no longer Jew nor Greek”) to all, readers of literature
can be said to perform their fidelity to the event of reading, which coincides
with the coming-into-being of the inventive work as such, not in isolation
(the original, quasi-private scene of reading — the dyadic encounter of reader
and work) but in the public, shared act of interpretation.67
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What motivates a reader to respond to an inventive work — to justify his
or her reading to others — is undoubtedly multiple. The works I have selected
all figure among the most frequently reprinted, studied, and commented
works in French literature. This choice might be said both to stem from and
to reinforce existing literary canons, leaving unquestioned their ideological
complicity in the production of “cultural capital.” As Pierre Bourdieu has aptly
demonstrated, canon watch, the dutiful patrolling of the “magical division”
separating high from low art, and the “cultural consecration” afforded by it,68
performs, intentionally or unintentionally, “a social function of legitimating social differences.”69 It is true that the literary — and in some cases the
philosophical — worth of the selected works is (currently) beyond dispute.
Literary critics and humanities professors must therefore be cognizant that
the promotion and teaching of such canonical works frequently serve, again
consciously or unconsciously, as “strategies of distinction,”70 inculcating in
students, or readers more generally, not only a love for high culture but also
a sense of cultural superiority. Yet to give attention only to this, to warn solely
against an investment in and a perpetuation of the literary canon, would
be to miss a fundamental point of the book. Unruly works make demands
on all readers: from neophytes to the most seasoned interpreters of literature, from students to professors to critics.71 Refusing both their idolatry
and instrumentalization, unruly works stubbornly insist that their readers
constantly question and reevaluate their readerly habitus or hermeneutic
parti pris.72 In this respect, affirming the canonical status of these works in
any straightforward manner — either by making them an unchanging “sure
and safe repository of the values of Western culture”73 (what hegemonic
cultural norms of distinction presuppose and promote), or, as we shall see
more closely, by seeing them simply as representative of a particular period
or movement — would be antithetical to our project, since it would function only to further their monumentalization, to contain and domesticate
their un-ruly and profoundly inventive force, disciplining and curtailing, by
extension, their readers’ curiosity.74
This book constitutes a series of case studies, responses to the challenges
of thinking the ethical in/as aesthetics. The selected works demonstrate the
multiplicity of the unruly, the differing ways in which unruliness manifests itself
across genres and in relation to varying and rivaling horizons of interpretation marking different historical periods. In this sense, my choice represents
only a sample of the many texts who share an ability to provoke an ethical
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response through their inventiveness, an ability to render the familiar unfamiliar — and, conversely, the unfamiliar familiar. My choice is not random,
however, in that I focus on works that point up the way in which a shared
intellectual history cannot fully account for or exhaust a particular text’s
unique figuration of the ethical double bind: the need both to understand
and respect the singularity of a literary work. Each unruly work stages the
ethical scene in unique and subtle ways, inciting us to engage in the act of
interpretation, to prolong the moment of meaning-making. Moreover, this
incitement is itself felt differently; texts that foster readerly identification, that
seemingly welcome explication, exert the force of the double bind in ways that
remain distinct from, but equally important as, the techniques deployed by
those works that explicitly frustrate interpretation through their modernist,
non-mimetic or deliberately opaque form.
Chapter 1 takes up the conjunctions and frictions between philosophy,
theory, and the literary through an examination of Michel de Montaigne’s
sixteenth-century Essays. As a work of accidental theory, the Essays inaugurate
a new type of philosophy: an unruly philosophy and a philosophy of the unruly
made possible through the essay form itself. Exceeding any strict generic definition, the essay operates as a mode of reading that emerges from, and helps to
sustain, Montaigne’s desire to think differently, to read otherwise than being. As
a mode of inquiry, essayistic thinking privileges a productive skepticism that
affords a different way of apprehending alterity — his own and that of others.
The essay unavoidably imposes form on Montaigne’s “unruly fantasies” but
a form that relentlessly refuses its own homogenization, illustrating but also
performing the elusive, fluctuating, and imperfect character of the self that
frustrates metaphysical permanence, ontological stability, or any sense of
completion. Focusing on Montaigne’s essaying of the self in its relation to the
other, this chapter explores the Essays as and through parallax, the dialectical
triangulation that the work itself both performs and demands of its readers.
Chapter 2 further interrogates the demands that an artwork makes of its
readers by turning to the concept of the “book as friend” in Denis Diderot’s
eighteenth-century fictional dialogue, Rameau’s Nephew. Diderot’s dialogue
between author-narrator-philosopher (referred to as “Moi,” or “Me”) and
his interlocutor, the morally depraved nephew (“Lui,” or “Him”), ostensibly
stages an allegory of the mind-and-body problem, a self-critical philosophical
debate between Cartesian idealism (the philosopher’s disembodied mind)
and eighteenth-century materialism (the nephew’s hungry body). Yet this
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Enlightenment dialogue reveals itself to be less concerned with arriving at
a moral lesson than first expected. Presenting its readers an unstable, distorted, and maddening moral universe, Rameau’s Nephew invites but also
frustrates readerly desire for friendship, the desire to identify (with) the
storyteller’s ethos. To whom is the dialogue most hospitable? The reader’s
sympathy hesitates between the philosopher — the defender of moral values (and status quo) — and the cynical, lazy, and seemingly “mad” nephew,
philosophy’s excluded other. Accommodating a series of divergent readings
without ever fully endorsing any, Rameau’s Nephew effectively short-circuits
its own philosophical subtext, and thwarts its own allegorical mechanisms.
Reading Diderot’s dialogue in light of the mind-and-body problem, then,
does not so much privilege a philosophical approach to the artwork (as yet
another eighteenth-century interpretation of the Cartesian problematic) as
foreground the work’s unruliness, its heteroclite and dislocating character:
its status as both a familiar product of Enlightenment philosophy and something foreign to it.
If the unruliness of Rameau’s Nephew resides in its elusive authorial voice
and refusal to serve as an illustration of either Enlightenment discourse
or its counterdiscourse, Charles Baudelaire’s nineteenth-century writings
make the unruly an aesthetic category of sorts. With Baudelaire’s neologism
modernité — “the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is one half of art,
the other being the eternal and the immutable”75 — the unruly undergoes a
radical transvaluation, becoming coterminous with the aesthetic experience:
to be modern is to be unruly. Chapter 3 investigates Baudelaire’s theorization
and practice of modernité (translatable both as modernity and modernism),
his engagement with translation as a means for challenging understandings
about poetry and reality and, more urgently, for thinking differently about
the experience and framing of modern life. The visual arts, especially painting and caricature, provided Baudelaire with valuable insights into modernité
that he sought, in turn, to translate into poetic language. For Baudelaire,
visual art did not simply help mediate his perception of modern life; it also
pointed to the violence and limits of translatability, serving as a parallax,
elucidating the gap between modern life and its aestheticized image. In his
later prose poems, collected in The Spleen of Paris, Baudelaire committed
himself to elucidating this ideological gap for his reading public. Through
his playful, self-critical, and inventive use of irony, Baudelaire contested
the modernist belief in the “autonomy of aesthetics,” exposing its dubious
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separation of art and its material source (implicating himself in the process),
while simultaneously disrupting his audience’s relentless thirst for interpretive pleasure and moral guidance.
Chapter 4 follows the developing and vexed relationship between author
and reader in Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1938 novel Nausea. From its very inception
Nausea has been intimately linked to Sartrean philosophy. The novel has been
said to highlight, through Roquentin’s drama, something timeless about the
existential condition, the absurdity of life, and the ultimate meaninglessness
of the world (Sartre had conceived of the novel as a “factum on Contingency”). Critics writing in the aftermath of the “death of the author” have
begun to complicate the relationship between Nausea and its author, refusing to submit it to an “author function” — that is, to make it “fit” into the
larger, coherent “thought” of Sartre. Yet refusing to read Nausea from within
a hermeneutic horizon determined by existential phenomenology need not
result in a disavowal of the artwork’s existentialist qualities. A responsive and
responsible encounter with Nausea cannot simply jettison an engagement
with its author, nor can it simply submit to Sartre’s authorial authority, to
either his early philosophy or his later self-critical assessment of Nausea in
his autobiography The Words. This chapter instead reads Nausea as Sartre’s
unruly progeny. Confirming and “countersigning” Sartre — reading his novel
with an eye for narrative moments that both reiterate and displace Sartrean
understanding76 — opens up the possibility for a different encounter with
the work, one that makes Nausea less readable but more inventive, one that
is less strictly faithful to its ideas but more responsive to its provocations.
The nouveau roman (New Novel) is the focus of chapters 5 and 6. Alain
Robbe-Grillet’s novel Jealousy, in many ways, can be said to illustrate RobbeGrillet’s modernist, if not postmodernist, bias against meaning, realism, and
narration, captured by his observation that “to tell a story has become strictly
impossible.”77 Offering these remarks in his influential manifesto For a New
Novel, Robbe-Grillet made clear his intention to renovate both the novel
form and the critical reading practices used in approaching the genre as a
whole. Robbe-Grillet’s radical contestation did not, however, simply provide
readers with a new interpretive paradigm; the question of how one can or
should interpret Jealousy’s formal strategies, its explicit rebuke of hermeneutic
containment and cognitive mastery, still remains open. The question of how
to respond to the Saying of Jealousy — a question of readerly responsibility
that the novel itself allegorizes or stages in several key scenes — is not just
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an intellectual or epistemological challenge but also an ethical one. Finally,
chapter 6 considers the gendering of unruliness in Marguerite Duras’s The
Ravishing of Lol Stein, a novel that radically rewrites the male fantasy narrative
about female trauma or madness, questioning the role of gendered experience in the interpretive process. Attending to the intersubjective demands
of the novel, its figuration of the ethical within and through language, this
chapter highlights the work’s inventiveness for feminism: the ways it elicits
and frustrates familiar, utilitarian, or overdetermined responses to sexual
difference. More specifically, the chapter reframes the terms of the debate
surrounding The Ravishing of Lol Stein, asking to what extent a faithful feminist reading depends on the reader’s ability to share Lol’s “experience,” and
to what extent the complexity of the male narrator’s writing of Lol — that
is, his writing of her ravishing and the ravishing of his writing — resists or
exceeds any straightforward identification with the female character or with
the “feminine” more generally.
The analyses that follow do not aim, of course, to exhaust an understanding
of unruliness. Nor do they offer a hermeneutic key for unlocking the unruliness
of any other text. Quite the opposite, the book offers itself as an apprenticeship in the unruly. There is no theory of the unruly; the unruly cannot be
determined in advance. It can only be grasped, or better yet, encountered
through examples. The study also takes to heart Montaigne’s observation
that “every example is lame [tout exemple cloche],”78 that every model (every
prior example or precedent) is always to some degree deficient in explaining
or accounting for the meaning of the specific case at hand. Montaigne’s selfcritical assessment — his implicit refusal to present himself as exemplary, a
model for imitation — could be paired with Derrida’s hyperbolic ethical utterance “tout autre est tout autre.”79 Derrida’s phrase contains within it a double
meaning; it can be translated as either “every other is completely other” or
“every other is every other.” But again, it is not a question of simply choosing between the two meanings. The sentence’s aporetic character demands a
parallactic reading. Likewise, each unruly work is radically singular, and yet
each work shares the identity of singularity, of unruliness. Conceptualizing
the relation to the unruly as a “relation without relation” renders problematic
the choice between pure otherness or pure sameness, and serves to block or
forestall the (illusory) hermeneutic security that the copula “is” (the unruly
work is. . .) might provide. Each case study can be said to exemplify the
unruly, while simultaneously resisting the imposition of the constraining logic
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of exemplarity (where an account of the unruly is made to stand for other
instances or, more precisely, readings of the unruly). Such a formulation of
the (non)exemplarity of case studies foregrounds an understanding of the
literary as an inappropriable alterity — with the ethical imperative to sustain
this alterity through the work of interpretation. Recognizing the lameness
of every reading thus goes hand in hand with recognizing the singularity of
the work interpreted. Such a recognition does not result in paralysis or starvation (in a denial of the reader’s will to know/interpret), nor in aesthetic
and epistemological relativism (an uncritical reiteration of the truism that
“all readings are misreadings”), but in the testing of readings and the fragile
promise of eating well.
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I
Montaigne
The Accidental Theorist

Theory . . . has no vested interests inasmuch as it never lays
claim to an absolute system, a non-ideological formulation
of itself and its “truths”; indeed, always itself complicit in the
being of current language, it has only the never-finished task
and vocation of undermining philosophy as such, of unraveling
affirmative statements and propositions of all kinds.
Fredric Jameson

After reflecting on the limits of man’s cognitive powers in a key passage from
the “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” Michel de Montaigne turns his attention to himself, taking stock of his own practice and its potential effects on
future generations:
Having found by experience that where one man had failed, another has succeeded, and that what was unknown to one century the following century
has made clear, and that the sciences and arts are not cast in a mold, but
are formed and shaped little by little, by repeated handling and polishing,
as the bears lick their cubs into shape at leisure, I do not leave off sounding
and testing what my powers cannot discover; and by handling again and
kneading this new matter, stirring it and heating it, I open up to whoever
follows me some facility to enjoy it more at his ease, and make it more
supple and manageable for him.
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Ayant essayé par experience que ce à quoy l’un s’estoit failly, l’autre y est
arrivé, et ce qui estoit incogneu à un siecle, le siecle suyvant l’a esclaircy,
et que les sciences et les arts ne se jettent pas en moule, ains se forment
et figurent peu à peu en les maniant et pollissant à plusieurs fois, comme
les ours façonnent leurs petits en les lechant à loisir: ce que ma force ne
peut descouvrir, je ne laisse pas de le sonder et essayer; et, en retastant et
pétrissant cette nouvelle matiere, la remuant et l’eschaufant, j’ouvre à celuy
qui me suit quelque facilité pour en jouir plus à son ayse, et le luy rends
plus souple et plus maniable.1
As the product of “experience” and “essaying,” Montaigne’s “new matter”
denotes at once his self and his book. It represents his contribution to the
existing and ever expanding body of human knowledge, his own response to
the Delphic injunction to “know thyself,” as well as the material product of his
intellectual labor. Montaigne’s “new matter” — which reminds us of his address
to the reader (“I am the matter of my book” [“je suis moy-mesme la matiere
de mon livre”]) — will then be passed on to his readers to come, “whoever
follows [him].” This process is not absent of authorial anxieties, however. Not
unlike a child who leaves home to go out into the world, the printed book of
the Essays attains a degree of autonomy and eventually comes to lie outside
the hermeneutic control of its father. Montaigne already hints at an uncanny
dissymmetry between himself and his book (his child of the mind):
Even in my own writings I do not always find again the sense of my first
thought; I do not know what I meant to say. (II, 12, 425–26b)
[My book] may know a good many things that I no longer know and hold
from me what I have not retained and what, just like a stranger, I should
have to borrow from it if I came to need it. If I am wiser than it, it is richer
than I. (II, 8, 293c, emphasis added)
En mes escris memes, je ne retrouve pas tousjours l’air de ma premiere
imagination: je ne scay ce que j’ay voulu dire. (566)
[Mon livre] peut sçavoir assez de choses que je ne sçay plus, et tenir de moy
ce que je n’ay point retenu et qu’il faudroit que, tout ainsi qu’un estranger,
j’empruntasse de luy, si besoin m’en venoit. Il est plus riche que moy, si je
suis plus sage que luy. (401–2)
Montaigne’s book is his, yet it is also like a stranger to him: it is him and not him.
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It is not surprising, then, that Montaigne expressed concern about his
reception. This chapter considers several questions first posed by the essayist
himself. Would the Essays be read as an “inventive work,” as a work that elicits
creative responses from its readers? Would the audience heed the author’s
call to be read and understood (“I am hungry to make myself known” [III,
5, 643b] [“Je suis affamé de me faire connoistre” (847)])? And more importantly, would they do justice to the singularity of his work — “the only book
in the world of its kind” [II, 8, 278c] [“le seul livre au monde de son espece”
(385)], as Montaigne describes it? Everything hinges on the readers’ refusal
to impose an unequivocal meaning (what would amount to casting his matter in a rigid mold). Or to put it in more positive terms: it all depends on
readers’ openness to the author’s essayistic process, on their recognition
of and contribution to Montaigne’s Pygmalion-like project of bringing his
philosophical work to life.2
The Essay: Between History and Philosophy
It is now a commonplace to acknowledge the “newness” and singularity of
Montaigne’s work in crediting him as the father of the essay, this extraordinary
hybrid genre that has appealed so well to readers’ hunger for both substance
and style. With the creation of the unruly essay, Montaigne did not simply
make famous a particular style of writing but also inaugurated a mode of
thinking intimately tied to the values of irresolution, wonder, and surprise.
Contingency rather than necessity guides the unfolding of Montaigne’s writing: “My conceptions and my judgment move only by groping, staggering,
stumbling, and blundering” (I, 26, 107a) [“Mes conceptions et mon jugement ne marche qu’à tastons, chancelant, bronchant et chopant” (146)].
Though they constantly probe the “inner springs” (II, 17, 481a) [“les resorts”
(634)] of his mind, Montaigne’s meditations yield no concrete foundational
knowledge. Purposive inquiry is met at every turn with textual resistance;
indeed, an irreducible gap between intention and outcome structures the
writings of the Essays — “I do not find myself in the place where I look; and
I find myself more by chance encounter than by searching my judgment” (I,
10, 26–27c) [“Je ne me trouve pas où je me cherche; et me trouve plus par
rencontre que par l’inquisition de mon jugement” (40)] — prefiguring, as
it were, Lacan’s anti-Cartesian claim, “I think where I am not, therefore I am
where I do not think.”3
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Philosophers and critical theorists have long recognized the disruptive
potential of the essay form, especially as practiced by Montaigne. Once
described by Theodor Adorno as “the critical force par excellence,” the essay
“gently defies the ideals of clara et distincta perceptio and of absolute certainty.”4 Michel Foucault also recognizes the essay’s contestative impulse and
its distrust of authoritative discourses. The essay — “the living substance of
philosophy” — does not legitimate “what is already known” but rather desires
to know “to what extent it might be possible to think differently.”5 Liberating
in an oblique, rather than straightforward way, the essay works to expand
thought and to create new ways of thinking: it unavoidably imposes form
on thought but a kind of form that relentlessly refuses its own homogenization as it tries to think both beyond its own cognitive limits and against the
dogmatic “image of thought”6 of any given historical period. As a mode of
philosophical discourse, essayistic thinking clearly exceeds a strict formalistic
definition of the essay. More than an approach to written thought, the essay
is a mode of reading reflecting a desire to know “to what extent it might be
possible” to read differently.
Yet as Montaignian critics with an eye for history continue to remind us,
the late sixteenth-century writer was working with a somewhat different,
historically specific concept, that of “essays.” In fact, we are arguably being
unfaithful to his use of the term when we refer to each chapter of the Essays
as an essay. “Publications à l’essai,” or trial publications, as George Hoffmann
points out, “did not so much constitute a genre as foster a provisional status
for their writers.”7 Hoffmann’s observation does not just clarify the historical origins of a contemporary term, however. It hints at the larger fault lines
distinguishing prevalent approaches to the Essays, and the essayistic process,
within the field of Montaigne scholarship. In his 2007 book, How to Read
Montaigne, Terence Cave explores such lines, explicitly addressing the hermeneutic pitfalls facing any reader of the Essays. For Cave, the interpretive
dilemma turns on the split consciousness that an author like Montaigne
demands of his audience.
A . . . fundamental question is whether we are to read the Essais primarily
as a product of late Renaissance humanism, steeped in the cultural habits
of that period, or as already a remarkably modern work. The answer is
that it is both, and that any viable reading will need to see both aspects,
shuttling between them as between the duck and the rabbit in the famous
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trick picture that Wittgenstein discusses in the Philosophical Investigations
(a drawing that can be seen as the head of either a duck or a rabbit but not
both at the same time).8
Reading Montaigne, according to Cave, does not simply entail choosing
between a historically sensitive reading of Montaigne’s Essays or adopting a
contemporary theoretical lens when interpreting his work. A “viable reading” must acknowledge both. The duck/rabbit metaphor adds a further layer
of complexity, since a harmonious account of the two is, strictly speaking,
impossible: you cannot see both the duck and the rabbit at the same time.
Yet Cave does qualify somewhat his observation, affirming the ideality of
its simultaneous representation: “Ideally, one would present the duck and
the rabbit as a single creature, but that isn’t possible in the linear mode of
expository prose.”9 It is unclear whether Cave means that it isn’t possible to
visually capture the Essays as a “singular creature” given the confinement of
the series (How to Read) under which the monograph appears. More likely,
Cave is alluding here to the general problem of commentary and its inevitable
betrayal of any text that it seeks to elucidate.
While the argument that we must not conflate the historical Montaigne
and our modern version of him is quite appealing, the hermeneutic value of
the duck/rabbit metaphor — especially when its aporetic structure is, ideally, surmountable — requires more scrutiny. Cave’s argument echoes and
updates in certain respects earlier debates about the limits of historicism.
As François Rigolot put it in an intervention on this subject, the charge of
anachronism should not give the accuser a false sense of hermeneutic security,
since any critic must avoid not only anachronism (the “aberrant projection
of the present onto the past”) but also catachronism (the “equally aberrant
illusion that one can capture the past without regard for the present that is
conditioning that capture”).10 Anachronism is indeed constitutive of any
reading of a historically distant author, so to read Montaigne today is to read
him anachronistically.11
Montaigne himself did not seem disturbed by this interpretive reality; he
readily acknowledged this practice, even praising its effects:
An able reader often discovers in other men’s writings perfections beyond
those that the author put in or perceived, and lends them richer meanings
and aspects. (I, 24, 93a)
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Un suffisant lecteur descouvre souvant és escrits d’autruy des perfections
autres que celles que l’autheur y a mises et apperceuës, et y preste des sens
et des visages plus riches. (127)12
Montaigne recognized, that is, that a work’s meaning inevitably exceeds
authorial intention and control. For Montaigne, then, anachronism (along
with one’s awareness of it) was not an obstacle but a condition for creative
interpretation, interpretation that would generously add to the semantic
richness of the text rather than reifying it as a pure object of analysis devoid
of any readerly participation.13
Imperfection’s Parallax
Might it not be more productive to see the reconstructive historical perspective and the contemporary theoretical perspective on Montaigne in terms of
the parallax view? Reading the Essays parallactically would affirm the aporia
of reading the historical Montaigne through our modern lens, an aporia that
the duck/rabbit metaphor articulates but ultimately fails to sustain. A parallax view on the Essays begins with shifting the terms of the debate, calling
into question the contemporary interpretive scene, a scene dominated if
not overdetermined by categories like the historical versus the modern (or
in Cave’s example, the duck versus the rabbit — or its happy synthesis in a
magical “single creature”). A parallactic mode of reading, in this respect, would
resemble and be faithful to the illogical logic of the essay: it would carefully
attend to the ways the essayist produces an array of incommensurable perspectives (there is no metalanguage of the Essays), sampling a wide range of
semiotic codes, while acknowledging that readers will invariably offer their
own perspectives on the Essays’ inexhaustible mix.14
This way of framing the parallax view also enables us to entertain more
than two perspectives on Montaigne (Montaigne as a man of the Renaissance
and Montaigne as our contemporary), opening a space for a multiplicity of
alternatives. In some ways, it recognizes that these perspectives were already
multiple, split from within: a contextualist approach may privilege the personal life of Montaigne (the Essays as autobiography) or it may accentuate the
historical events of the period (the wars of religion, the New World conquest,
etc.). Likewise, a contemporary perspective may borrow from the language
of psychoanalysis, deconstruction, or feminism, to name a few. Again, the
interpretive challenge lies not in any attempt to harmonize these perspectives,
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to naturalize their differences, but to embrace (and responsively contribute
to) their frictions and incommensurabilities.
To return to Hoffmann’s observation that “publications à l’essai did not
so much constitute a genre as foster a provisional status for their writers,” I
would propose that the problematic of imperfection itself — a major concern
of the Essays — exceeds its original context. The notion itself needs to be
rethought parallactically. Lacking the perfection of some authors — who did
not hesitate to produce final versions of their work, published as discourses,
for example — Montaigne keenly recognizes his ontological unrootedness,
which in turn compels the act of essaying: “If my mind could gain a firm
footing,” Montaigne famously pondered in “Of Repentance,” “I would not
make essays, I would make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and on
trial” (III, 2, 611b) [“Si mon ame pouvoit prendre pied, je ne m’essaierois pas,
je me resoudrois: elle est tousjours en apprentissage et en espreuve” (805)].
Adding to the essay’s semantic richness and complexity is its transmutation
into a verb. This move arguably shifts our attention from the question of the
essay (the essay as a genre and the vexed issue of its historicity) to the meaning of essaying (the essay as a hermeneutic practice).
In the liminal chapter “Of Idleness,” Montaigne presents himself first and
foremost as an interpreter of his own unruliness. It is Montaigne’s ideas or
fantaisies that evoke defiance and frustration. By describing them as “chimeras
and fantastic monsters” (I, 8, 21a) [“chimeres et monstres fantasques” (33)],
Montaigne from the start recognizes his subject matter’s profound indocility, its challenge to hermeneutic mastery. In a late addition to “Of the Power
of the Imagination,” Montaigne also evokes the theme of unruliness when
talking of his sexual organ:
People are right to notice the unruly liberty of this member, obtruding so
importunately when we have no use for it, and failing so importunately
when we have the most use for it, and struggling for mastery so imperiously
with our will, refusing with so much pride and obstinacy our solicitations,
both mental and manual. (I, 20, 72c)
On a raison de remarquer l’indocile liberté de ce membre, s’ingerant si
importunement, lors que nous n’en avons que faire, et defaillant si importunement, lors que nous en avons le plus affaire, et contestant de l’authorité
si imperieusement avec nostre volonté, refusant avec tant de fierté et
d’obstination noz solicitations et mentales et manuelles. (102).
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Ironically imputing agency to his “unruly member,” Montaigne rejects the
ideal of perfectio (man’s identification with the divine), expressing his skepticism about the mind’s ability to achieve any semblance of classic self-mastery.
Here Montaigne, through his emphasis on the arbitrariness of sexual desire,
demystifies the concept of the will valorized by prior Renaissance humanists
such as Pico della Mirandola.15 In his Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), the
Italian philosopher argued that God made man neither mortal nor immortal,
giving him instead the freedom and power to be his own sculptor and creator.16
With this ontological makeup of the self, Pico all but created the Renaissance myth of the self-made man — a subject capable of freely cultivating
his soul and elevating himself to God-like stature. This optimistic humanist
ideal finds its radical counterpart in Montaigne, who, in the closing pages of
the Essays, depicts the violence inherent in the project of perfecting the self
when perfectio hominis becomes coterminous with the eradication of one’s
libidinal desires and corporeality: “That is madness: instead of changing into
angels [in order to be closer to the divinitas of God], they change into beasts
[a regression to the realm of animalitas]; instead of raising themselves, they
lower themselves” (III, 13, 856b, emphasis added) [“C’est folie: au lieu de
se transformer en anges, ils se transforment en bestes; au lieu de se hausser,
ils s’abattent” (1115)]. With this conduplicatio, the repetition of the verb “se
transformer,” Montaigne emphasizes the role of agency, thus pointing out that
those who seek to perfect themselves are to a large extent responsible for their
condition in their practices of self-care, practices that ironically might be better
described, following Nietzsche, as symptomatic of an “incuria sui,” a carelessness of the self.17 The essayist, for his part, declines such a transcendental pull
to go outside oneself (857b/1115), joyfully affirming his temporality, or as he
puts it, his “temporal greatness,” (III, 7, 700c) [“grandeur temporelle” (917)].
Indeed, the essay form thrives in the absence of permanence. Not conducive to conceptuality — to the formation of concepts for the purpose of
hermeneutic mastery — the essay produces monsters, engendering unruly
images in the perplexed mind of its author, making it (the essay) and him
(Montaigne) unlikely models of and for perfection. The author’s original
desire to impose a discursive order on his formless thoughts, “hoping in time
to make [his] mind ashamed of itself ” (I, 8, 21a) [“esperant avec le temps luy
en faire honte à luy mesmes” (33)], proves unsuccessful, as evidenced by his
reference to them in a later essay as “grotesques and monstrous bodies” (I,
28, 135a) [“crotesques et corps monstrueux” (183)]. Such a failure to conform
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to the ideal of stasis, an ideal revered by the Senecan sage, has led critics to
reconceptualize the author’s understanding of perfection (and imperfection)
in terms of his investment in skepticism. In his article “Epoche as Perfection:
Montaigne’s View of Ancient Skepticism,” José R. Maia Neto carefully examines
Montaigne’s description of skepticism in the “Apology for Raymond Sebond,”
demonstrating how the essayist conceives of this ancient school as having
reached “the utmost height of human nature” (371a) [“la hauteur extreme
de l’humaine nature” (502)]. Understanding perfection in the Aristotelian
sense of accomplishment, Neto argues that the skeptic notion of epoche, the
suspension of judgment (“‘I hold back, I do not budge’” (374a) [“je soutiens,
je ne bouge” [505]), enables individuals to be who they are (it acknowledges
the limited character of their nature) and thus provides, for Montaigne, the
best means of attaining happiness. According to Neto, Socrates — the father of
ancient skepticism — becomes the object of genuine imitatio for Montaigne,
since the former embodies the disruptive and dialogical thrust —
The leader of his dialogues, Socrates, is always asking questions and stirring up discussion, never concluding, never satisfying; and says he has no
other knowledge than that of opposing. (II, 12, 377c)
Le conducteur de ses dialogismes, Socrates, va tousjours demandant et
esmouvant la dispute, jamais l’arrestant, jamais satisfaisant, et dict n’avoir
autre science que la science de s’opposer. (509)
— that the latter’s essayistic style will seek to duplicate at the textual level.18
Conversely, Emmanuel Faye, in his impressive volume Philosophie et perfection de l’homme: De la Renaissance à Descartes, relegates this central passage
from the “Apology” to a footnote, choosing instead to focus on “the moral
wisdom of Socrates,”19 on a Socrates who embodies the ethos of philosophy,
“this confidence in the natural capacities and faculties of man, in his aptitude
to fulfill his potential on his own, in the goal of achieving his own perfection.”20
Sharing the Socratic ideal of wisdom, Montaigne defines humanity in moral
rather than theological terms, grounding it in conscience rather than devotion.21 On Faye’s account, Montaigne’s perfection does not lie in his skeptical
epoche but in his valorization of human dignity, in his quest for knowledge.
Faye reminds us that the essayist, far from being critical of philosophy, recommends to his ideal tutor that philosophy become the primary subject
matter for the pupil: “For philosophy, which, as the molder of judgment and
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conduct, will be his principal lesson, has this privilege of being everywhere
at home” (I, 26, 121–22a) [“Car la philosophie, qui, comme formatrice des
jugements et des meurs, sera sa principale leçon, a ce privilege de se mesler
par tout” (164)]. Montaigne’s Essays and fantasies are indeed presented by
their own author as “purely human and philosophical, with no admixture of
theology” (I, 56, 234b) [“purement humains et philosophiques, sans meslange
de Theologie” (322)].
These words take center stage as well in Tzvetan Todorov’s study Le Jardin imparfait: La pensée humaniste en France, inaugurating, as it were, a new
humanism that will find its full realization in the Enlightenment:
The term humanist has several meanings, but we can say in a first approximation that it refers to the doctrines according to which man is the point
of departure and the point of reference for human actions. . . . The term
humanist figures, perhaps for the first time in French, in a passage by Montaigne in which he uses it to characterize his own practice, in contrast to
that of theologians. Though he grants the theologians their right to respect,
and certainly to existence, he prefers to separate the two domains and
reserve a new field for the “humanists,” which consists of strictly human
activities or “fantasies,” of “pure human” writings.22
Contrary to Faye, Todorov does not perceive any commitment to perfectio
hominis in Montaigne’s Essays. Quite the opposite, it is imperfection, synonymous here with critical skepticism, that plays a structural role in the author’s
work. Todorov borrows the title of his volume from Montaigne: “(a) Je veux
qu’on agisse, (c) et qu’on allonge les offices de la vie tant qu’on peut, (a) et
que la mort me treuve plantant mes chous, mais nonchalant d’elle, et encore
plus de mon jardin imparfait” (I, 20, 89). The English title of Todorov’s book
is Imperfect Garden, which cannot fully convey the semantic richness of the
French word. The term has posed a problem for Montaigne’s English translators, as the following versions show:
I would have a man to be doing, and to prolong his lives offices, as much as
lieth in him, and let death carelesse of her dart, but more of my unperfect
garden.23
I want us to be doing things, prolonging life’s duties as much as we can;
I want Death to find me planting my cabbages, neither worrying about it
nor the unfinished gardening.24
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I want a man to act, and to prolong the functions of life as long as he can;
and I want death to find me planting my cabbages, but careless of death,
and still more of my unfinished garden.25
Of the three translations, Florio’s now archaic unperfect retains imparfait’s
double meaning of imperfect and incomplete. A recent translation into modern
French substitutes inachevé (unfinished) for imparfait in order to capture
one sense of the word lost to modern ears, but thereby excludes the other.26
It is not, of course, a question of choosing between the two: Montaigne is
surely playing with the epithet’s double meaning. As with Neto and Faye,
Todorov opts for a “philosophical” interpretation of imparfait, limiting, in
turn, the word’s semantic slipperiness. Such a content-oriented reading fails
to appreciate fully the performative dimension of the Essays. To do justice
to any problematic addressed in the Essays, Montaigne’s reader must take
seriously the unruly form of the essay.
Resolutely dwelling in his jardin imparfait, in the world of perpetual flux,
Montaigne is the anti-Parmenides par excellence, refusing the unity of being
and thinking. In contradistinction to the metaphysical view that being and
thinking coincide, Montaigne embraces a subject matter that is, in Levinasian
parlance, otherwise than being. Its pursuit is an endless task: “There is no end
to our researches; our end is in the other world” (III, 13, 817b) [“Il n’y a point
de fin en nos inquisitions; nostre fin est en l’autre monde” (1068)]. At this
point, one is tempted to see Montaigne as a philosopher of becoming:
I cannot keep my subject still. It goes along befuddled and staggering, with
a natural drunkenness. I take it in this condition, just as it is at the moment
I give my attention to it. I do not portray being: I portray passing. . . . If my
mind could gain a firm footing, I would not make essays, I would make
decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and on trial. (III, 2, 610–11b)
Je ne puis asseurer mon object. Il va trouble et chancelant, d’une yvresse
naturelle. Je le prens en ce poinct, comme il est, en l’instant que je m’amuse
à luy. Je ne peints pas l’estre. Je peints le passage. . . . Si mon ame pouvoit
prendre pied, je ne m’essaierois pas, je me resoudrois: elle est tousjours
en apprentissage et en espreuve. (805)
Contrary to the didactic humanist leçons that preceded them, the Essays do
not easily lend themselves to hermeneutic consumption; they only afford
tentative and contestable self-knowledge.
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This might make Montaigne the essayist more of an anti-philosopher
to the extent that perfection is not simply recognized as an impossibility — imperfection is not, as the classic philosopher would have it, what one
has to settle for in light of the unreachable plenitude of Being. Imperfection
as such undergoes a process of transvaluation in the Essays. Like Nietzsche,
who critically reappraised the world of appearance — conceiving of it outside
the static Platonic opposition of appearance and reality (“We have abolished
the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps? . . . But no!
With the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!”27) — Montaigne
alters the received meaning of imperfection, and more importantly, compels
us to question the desirability of perfection, short-circuiting the Platonist
system of thought.
Throughout the Essays, Montaigne expresses an unwillingness to mask his
imperfections, preferring instead that his self-portrait be that of an imperfect,
incomplete, and ever-changing face:
However that may be, I mean to say, and whatever these absurdities may
be, I have had no intention of concealing them, any more than I would a
bald and graying portrait of myself, in which the painter had drawn not a
perfect face, but mine. (I, 26, 108a)
Quoy qu’il en soit, veux-je dire, et quelles que soyent ces inepties, je n’ay
pas deliberé de les cacher, non plus qu’un mien pourtraict chauve et grisonnant, où le peintre auroit mis, non un visage parfaict, mais le mien. (148)
Montaigne’s acknowledgment of his own “imperfect face” not only contributes to the problematization of a definitive answer to the question of identity
(who he is) but also informs his interpretation of others (who the other is).
But what does the face of the other look like? Hospitality toward alterity, as
Lawrence Kritzman rightly observes, “requires the ability to transcend the
self-contained world of narcissism.”28 Montaigne thematizes most clearly his
ethics of alterity in the beginning of his essay “Of Cato the Younger,” where he
admits his aversion to a relation to the other that neutralizes and assimilates
the other’s difference:
[a] I do not share that common error of judging another by myself. I easily
believe that another man may have qualities different from mine. . . . [c] I
more easily admit difference than resemblance between us. . . . I consider
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him simply in himself, without relations to others; I mold him to his own model.
(I, 37, 169, emphasis added)
[a] Je n’ay point cette erreur commune de juger d’un autre selon que je suis.
J’en croy aysément des choses diverses à moy. Je . . . [c] reçoy plus facilement
la difference que la ressemblance en nous. Je. . . le considere simplement en
luy-mesme, sans relation, l’estoffant sur son propre modelle. (I, 37, 229)
We cannot solely rely, of course, on Montaigne’s stated predilection to receive
alterity. We must always keep Montaigne’s desire in mind while also separating
this desire from his textual performances. What Montaigne expresses in the
above passage is a paradoxical ethical relation to the other. Montaigne’s hermeneutics of difference is paradoxical to the extent that his ethical relation to the
other — to any other — is, strictly speaking, “without relation.” His hermeneutic
model posits an object of knowledge without, at the same time, acknowledging
the voracious subject of knowledge. Yet not unlike his hunger to make himself
known to others, Montaigne’s hunger for others is conditioned by an aporetic
logic of its own. It expresses a double desire: first, a desire to know the other;
second, a desire to sustain a relation of non-adequation, in which the other is
irreducible to my cognitive powers. Montaigne’s generous impulse29 to engage
with the otherness of past, present, and future minds captures the former desire
(to know the other), whereas the dream of a pure ethics attests to the latter
desire (to keep the other at an ethical distance beyond his narcissistic grasp).
What enables Montaigne to manage the incommensurability of these desires
is the essay itself. Resistant to synthesis, the essay foregrounds hesitation as
a hermeneutic stance and practice; it illustrates and enacts a new mode of
thought. Montaigne may have only dreamed of a new language of skepticism,
as his observation on the ancient skeptics suggests:
I can see why the Pyrrhonian philosophers cannot express their general
conception in any manner of speaking; for they would need a new language. (II, 12, 392b)
Je voy les philosophes Pyrrhoniens qui ne peuvent exprimer leur generale
conception en aucune maniere de parler: car il leur faudroit un nouveau
langage. (527).
Yet while the conditional “would need” hints at the virtual character or irreality of this “new language,” the very language of the Essays arguably performs
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a kind of “Pyrrhonian abstinence,”30 pointing to the reality of such a new
language (“a Pyrrhonism in an affirmative form” [376a] [“un Pyrrhonisme
soubs une forme resolutive” (507)], in ways that may have exceeded Montaigne’s own imagination. The newness of this skeptical language might also
figure in Montaigne’s scandalous question “What do I know?” (393b) [“Que
sçay-je?” (527)].31 Robert Eaglestone sums up well the ethical force of the
interrogative: “Unlike a statement, a question is to be interrupted: a question
starts a dialogue. An idea phrased as a question resists closure and begs not
only an answer but another question, an interruption.”32
As we saw, the initial attempts to tame his unruly thoughts, to discipline
them via writing, prove wholly unsuccessful, that is, not amenable to humanist
discourse. Yet this “failure” gives birth to Montaigne the essayist, “a new figure:
an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher” (II, 12, 409c) [“Nouvelle
figure: un philosophe impremedité et fortuite” (546)].33 This “new figure” of
the “accidental philosopher” might in fact be better described as an accidental
theorist, if we understand theory as skeptical resistance,34 as a resistance to
philosophy’s timeless dream of permanence and plenitude (the desire for
unmediated Being, the Platonic eidos, the Thing itself, etc.). Indeed, Montaigne’s philosopher of choice is not the authoritative Plato championed by
Neoplatonists and others35 but the skeptical Socrates of Plato’s dialogues.
Montaigne’s Socrates “is always asking questions and stirring up discussion,
never concluding, never satisfying; and says he has no other knowledge than
that of opposing.”36 It is this Socratic negativity that Montaigne the accidental
theorist harnesses in the Essays. Montaigne, then, may have begun as a traditional philosopher, committed to hermeneutic self-mastery à la Seneca (as
expressed in his desire to be “master of [him]self in every direction” [III, 5,
639b] [“maistre de [s]oy, à tout sens” (841)]), only to come full circle, taking
Seneca’s observation that “anything that can be added to is imperfect” as a
condition for productive thinking rather than a prohibition.37
Monstrous Reading/Reading the Monstrous
Montaigne’s skepticism can perhaps be ascertained most visibly in his resistance
to the humanist ideology of his period. One of the chief tropes of humanist discourse is the digestive metaphor, which transforms the Renaissance
author into a cultural cannibal.38 The metaphor structures Joachim Du Bellay’s influential Defense and Illustration of the French Language (1549), which
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calls upon the French to emulate the Romans, who enriched themselves by
“imitating the best Greek authors, transforming themselves into them, devouring them, and after having fully digested them, converting them into blood
and nourishment.”39 Conforming to his humanist horizon of expectations,
Montaigne makes ample use of the digestive metaphor: “What good does it
do us to have our belly full of meat if it is not digested, if it is not transformed
into us, if it does not make us bigger and stronger?” (I, 25, 101a) [“Que nous
sert-il d’avoir la panse pleine de viande, si elle ne se digere? si elle ne se transforme en nous? si elle ne nous augmente et fortifie?” (137).40 This thought is,
of course, already present in Montaigne’s “To the Reader,” where the essayist asserts that he is himself the matter of his book. But what are the ethical
implications of the digestive metaphor when it is the other who is the object
of knowledge? Isn’t there an ethical violence intrinsic to the absorption of
the other’s otherness, to the humanist literary cannibalization of difference?
In other words, then, how does Montaigne eat?
In an attempt to answer this question, I propose to turn in this final section to
Montaigne’s representation of conjoined twins in his chapter “Of a Monstrous
Child,” juxtaposing this depiction of difference with the author’s avowed dream
of a relationless account of the other, his wish to consider the other simply in
himself, without relations to others; molding him to his own model. What is at
stake here is the possibility of a “purist” ethical stance, the recognition that, to
borrow Derrida’s formulation, “every other is completely other [tout autre est
tout autre].” Is Montaigne’s figuration of the monstrous child an example of the
other as tout autre? At first glance, in his appeal to rationality (“this universal and
natural reason” [II, 30, 539c] [“cette raison universelle et naturelle” (713)]) as a
tool to combat and rectify our tendency to err and be astonished by “novelty”
(539c) (“la nouvelleté” [713]), Montaigne’s representation of the monstrous
child might strike the reader more as proto-Cartesian than Levinasian.41 For
Montaigne the rationalist, the experience of monstrosity is ultimately a misrecognition, evidence of our inability to transcend our particular perspective,
to step outside the workings of custom — to emancipate ourselves from this
“violent and treacherous schoolmistress” (I, 23, 77a) [“violente et traistresse
maistresse d’escole” [109]). The child in itself is not monstrous either to God
or to nature. Following Augustine, Montaigne writes in his Bordeaux Copy,
What we call monsters are not so to God, who sees in the immensity
of his work the infinity of forms that he has comprised in it. . . . We call
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contrary to nature what happens contrary to custom; nothing is anything
but according to nature, whatever it may be. (539c)
Ce que nous appellons monstres, ne le sont pas à Dieu, qui voit en
l’immensité de son ouvrage l’infinité des formes qu’il y a comprinses. . . .
Nous apelons contre nature ce qui advient contre la coustume: rien n’est
que selon elle, quel qu’il soit. (713)
To be sure, the use of the term “monstrous” might be necessary (Montaigne,
in fact, gives it prominence by placing it in the title of the essay) until we
detach ourselves from our (subjective) perspective, elevate ourselves above
the insidious workings of custom, and come to view the world from God’s
standpoint, adopting, in other words, a “view from nowhere.”42 At the very
least, Montaigne’s reflections on the fictitious nature of monstrosity appear
to be hinting at the possibility of an objective apprehension of the child. But
by positing the child’s objective reality, hasn’t Montaigne at the same time
reduced the radical other to an object of discourse by transforming him into
a theme, an example of Nature?
While Montaigne does seem to gesture toward a purist epistemological
stance (a totalized relation to the object of knowledge, a radical reversal of
his ethical wish to read the other according to his own model), I would argue
that Montaigne, unlike Augustine, adopts this ideal epistemic position for
rhetorical purposes. As a remedy for our will to allegorize — that is, society’s
penchant for ideologically transmuting physical deformation into an otherworldly phenomenon — Montaigne posits a divine, unmediated perspective paradoxically in order to demystify common readings of the monstrous
child. Such readings interpret the child as an omen, a providential sign (“a
favorable prognostic” [539/713a]) within a metaphysical framework: it is
sent by God to show the king how to deal with rivaling political factions. If
Montaigne is justified in objecting to the instrumentalization and political
allegorization of the child,43 does he go too far in annulling the other’s alterity? An answer to this question hinges on the meaning of alterity. Montaigne
is not necessarily objecting to a Levinasian understanding of alterity, where
“the other bears alterity as an essence,”44 but to the speculative meaning one
imputes to this alterity, to the horizon of meaning under which the child’s
intelligibility is made manifest. As an alternative to the typically speculative
early modern accounts of “monsters,” Montaigne offers a remarkably brief
physical description of the child, who is joined to a second, headless body,45
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returning him (in the late addition to the essay) to his rightful place within
the order of things, among God’s diverse creatures. The allegorical reading
of the child thus serves as an example of interpretations to avoid; the case of
the “imperfect child” (538a) [“enfant imparfait” (713)] illustrates the need to
beat down our will to know/mystify, to keep in check our libido sciendi, for,
as he tells us elsewhere, “I am afraid we have eyes bigger than our stomachs,
and more curiosity than capacity” (I, 31, 150a) [“J’ay peur que nous ayons
les yeux plus grands que le ventre, et plus de curiosité que nous n’avons de
capacité” (203)].
But is a cognitive awareness of the distinction between one’s experience
of the world (seeing the child as monstrous) and the reality of the world
(everything in the world is natural) sufficient to transform or reform our
prereflective consciousness of the world? Can we escape so easily from
custom? For Montaigne, denaturalizing custom involves a perpetual critique, a constant struggle against the forces that have given us “the laws of
conscience” (I, 23, 83c) [“les loix de la conscience” (115)], that have made
custom second nature to us: “Habit is a second nature, and no less powerful” (III, 10, 772b) [“L’accoustumance est une seconde nature, et non moins
puissante” (1010)]. In this light, Montaigne’s more positive imperative to
naturalize nature seems naïvely optimistic. To naturalize the strange child
would amount to seeing him outside of interpretation, where the other’s
underlying “natural” sameness — that is, his humanity — would be simultaneously revealed and embraced.
Yet for Montaigne, human nature and more generally the world (“the
world is nothing but variety and dissimilarity” [II, 2, 244a] [“le monde n’est
que varieté et dissemblance” [339]) are hardly homogenous: “There is more
difference between a given man and a given man than between a given animal and a given man” (II, 12, 342a) [“Il se trouve plus de difference de tel
homme à tel homme que de tel animal à tel homme” (466)]. Recognizing
a shared humanity with the child does not rule out an appreciation of his
difference. Moreover, difference does not only pertain to external matters,
matters concerning the other. The difference of the other should not blind
us to the difference that inhabits all human beings:
We are all patchwork, and so shapeless and diverse in composition that
each bit, each moment, plays its own game. And there is as much difference
between us and ourselves as between us and others. (II, 1, 244a)
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Nous sommes tous de lopins, et d’une contexture si informe et diverse,
que chaque piece, chaque momant, faict son jeu. Et se trouve autant de
difference de nous à nous mesmes, que de nous à autruy. (337)
Montaigne illustrates, if not performs, the unruliness of his own alterity in
“Of Cripples,” where the cognitive distinction between being and appearance
that structures Montaigne’s thought in “Of a Monstrous Child” is displaced
and rendered virtually ineffective:
I have seen no more evident monstrosity and miracle in the world than
myself. We become habituated to anything strange by use and time; but the
more I frequent myself and know myself, the more my deformity astonishes
me, and the less I understand myself. (III, 11, 787b)
Je n’ay veu monstre et miracle au monde plus expres que moy-mesme.
On s’apprivoise à toute estrangeté par l’usage et le temps; mais plus je me
hante et me connois, plus ma difformité m’estonne, moins je m’entens en
moy. (1029).46
Far from resulting in a privileged access to one’s being, or in the affirmation
of autonomy, essayistic self-study defamiliarizes and astonishes its faithful
practitioner. It discloses reason in its utter weakness or lameness; like a cripple,
reason limps. It fails to secure the foundations for self-knowledge; yet in its
failure, reason — under the pressure of the essaying process — paradoxically
succeeds in revealing to its author his irreducible alterity, his own monstrosity.
To be clear, experiencing himself as monstrous here is not a misrecognition
(of his “natural” being) but an attestation of his unruly self, or what we could
describe as his semiotic monstrosity, a self that is beyond representational or
hermeneutic mastery. Indeed, so cognizant of his own foreignness to himself,
how can Montaigne assert the transparency and homogeneity of the other?47
More importantly, Montaigne’s untotalizable self-relation obliquely points to
an extra-discursivity, to something that escapes the habitual economy of the
Same, yet without simultaneously positing a self that is outside the realm of
interpretation and becoming.
Counterbalancing the insights of “Of a Monstrous Child” with those of “Of
Cripples,” then, enables the reader to entertain a parallax view of monstrosity,
which reveals a very different and far less Cartesian account of monstrosity
than was suggested earlier. While “Of a Monstrous Child” warns against the
dangers of astonishment (“the error and astonishment that novelty brings us”
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[539c] [“l’erreur et l’estonnement que la nouvelleté nous apporte” [713]), “Of
Cripples” presents astonishment as the appropriate response to the author’s
natural unruliness and semiotic monstrosity. As if directly responding to the
excesses of the Montaignian self, to the self ’s internal otherness, Descartes
moves to pathologize the experience of “astonishment”: “Astonishment is
an excess of wonder which can never be anything but bad,” he writes in The
Passions of the Soul.48 This Cartesian critique of astonishment should not
be confused with Montaigne’s. If Descartes is primarily concerned with the
possibility of epistemological paralysis (the cogito’s inability to convert the
new — the object of wonder, attractive in its rarity — into an object of knowledge), Montaigne’s “Of a Monstrous Child” decries the allergic, exploitative,
and totalizing reactions that the newness or singularity of the child’s unruly
body has provoked.
In “Of Cripples,” Montaigne offers an alternative account of astonishment, one that is to be identified not with paralysis but with care, that is,
an attentiveness to the inexhaustible and heterogeneous nature of his self.
Such a care begins with a care for language, expressing his preference for the
tentative, the partial:
It makes me hate probable things when they are planted on me as infallible. I like these words, which soften and moderate the rashness of our
propositions: “perhaps,” “to some extent,” “some,” “they say,” “I think,”
and the like. (788b)
On me faict hayr les choses vray-semblables quand on me les plante pour
infaillibles. J’ayme ces mots, qui amollissent et moderent la temerité de
nos propositions: A l’avanture, Aucunement, Quelque, On dict, Je pense,
et semblables. (1030)
A more nuanced or self-critical response to astonishment is arguably already at
work in “Of a Monstrous Child.” At first glance, Montaigne might be accused
of having replaced one totalized relation for another, affirming at the end of the
essay the ontological Said of the child: he is, in the final analysis, natural like
us. Does Montaigne fail, then, to respond to the alterity of the child, effacing
the differences that ought to have sustained their dissymmetrical relation?
How does Montaigne preserve the child as a genuine object of wonder?
It is not by establishing a relation to an absolute alterity that Montaigne
extends his care to the other, since reading the other according to his own
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model is, strictly speaking, impossible — or rather, it is only “possible” for God.
Knowledge of God is a limit case. In the “Apology for Raymond Sebond,”
Montaigne also conceives of God as an object of wonder, irreducible to
what is familiar, an “incomprehensible power” (380a/513).49 A recognition
of God’s absolute alterity is what Montaigne, along with Saint Paul, finds
“most excusable” in pagan religions (380a/513). Yet Montaigne’s relation
to others differs from his relation to God in that his quest to know others
is problematized rather than relinquished; it is complicated by the essaying process, a constant return to the skeptical question “What do I know?”
Montaigne never subjects God to essaying. Whereas a respect for the alterity
of God stems in large part from one’s faith in Him (God cannot be known
directly nor by “our analogies and conjectures” [380a/512]), Montaigne’s
respect for the other’s alterity is of a different ethical order; it derives from
his self-exploration, from his awareness that the other is as elusive as the
author’s unruly self.
In “Of a Monstrous Child,” the child’s alterity (the tout autre of the child)
is affirmed in relational rather than in absolute terms. Montaigne’s ethical
sensibility can be formulated in terms of a double movement, a movement
intrinsic to the endless act of eating well — the perpetual unsaying and resaying
of the ontological Said. The essayist demystifies monstrosity by affirming a
shared humanity with the child. In neutralizing the child’s cultural alterity — his
source of instrumentalization, exploitation, and dehumanization — Montaigne
cannibalizes or assimilates the monstrous other, transforming him into a
comprehensible object of knowledge. Yet this process of cannibalization also
reflects an interplay between mastery and opacity. The alterity of the child
is not affirmed in abstraction but experienced as a rupture, a textual disturbance relative to his readers’ expectations. This recognition/reinscription of
difference, performed through a problematization of pre-given schemata
and categories, is further displayed by Montaigne’s staging of the incommensurability of his situated (historical) reader’s contingent position and
the ideal (ahistorical) epistemological view from nowhere (that of God or
Nature). By offering his readers two subject positions that they cannot simply
adopt or reject, Montaigne attests to the perplexities involved in representing the other. This rhetorical strategy, especially if read comparatively with
the essayist’s self-avowed semiotic monstrosity in “Of Cripples,” preserves
the irreducibility and mystery of the other, which in turn helps to sustain a
relation of non-adequation (a “relation without relation”) with the child,
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and guarantees that the “monstrous” other will continue to shock and to
produce astonishment in the beholder. But unlike the version condemned
by Montaigne in “Of a Monstrous Child,” this astonishment is a precondition
for ethics or eating well, arising from the beholder’s generosity and openness
to alterity, from a sensibility, that is, to the diversity and unruliness of nature.
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